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Abstract
Since the transition to agricultural production, property rights to land have been a key 
institution for economic development. Clearly defined land rights provide economic agents 
with increased access to credit, secure returns on investment, free up resources used to 
defend one’s land rights, and facilitate land market transactions. Formalized land records 
also strengthen governments’ capacity to tax land-owners. Despite a large body of extant 
micro-level empirical studies, macro-level research on the evolution of formal rights to 
land, and their importance for economic growth, has so far been lacking. In this paper, we 
present a novel data set on the emergence of state-administered cadasters (i.e. centralized 
land records) for 159 countries over the last millennium. We also analyze empirically the 
association between the development of cadastral institutions and long-run economic 
growth in a panel of countries. Our findings demonstrate a substantive positive effect of the 
introduction of cadasters on modern per capita income levels, supporting theoretical 
conjectures that states with more formalized property rights to land should experience 
higher levels of economic growth.
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1 Introduction
Well-defined property rights are central to current understanding of the causes of economic
development (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Coase, 1960; North, 1990). For a number of reasons, it
is believed that property rights to land play a particularly important part in the process of
economic development. Before the Industrial Revolution, land was one of the two key factors of
production (labour being the other) and also constituted the most important source of wealth
in Western Europe and the USA up into the early twentieth century (Piketty, 2014). Land
remains a crucial production asset in many developing countries today, both as an important
element in the global food supply chain and a source of livelihood for many households as they
harvest its fruit, graze animals or use the water it carries. Further, due to “its immobility
and virtual indestructibility”(Gardner & Rausser, 2001, p. 299), land lends itself to use as
collateral, thereby intensifying monetization of the economy and economic exchange. However,
both historically and today, land rights tend, to a large extent, to be poorly defined. De Soto
(2016a,b) estimates that about 4.7 billion of the global population lack formal property rights
to land.
A large body of theoretical literature argues that clearly defined land rights provide eco-
nomic agents with secure returns on investment, reduce the resources needed to defend one’s
land, facilitate land market transactions and allocation of scarce resources to the most efficient
user, and increase access to credit. Despite these strong theoretical reasons, no clear-cut conclu-
sion emerges from empirical studies that have attempted to test the link between well-defined
property rights in land and economic growth. Existing literature is dominated by research on
micro-level and lacks a cross-country perspective. Furthermore, most studies have examined
short-term effects and the long-term impact of the evolution of land rights remain overlooked.
This paper attempts to address these gaps by empirically examining the relationship be-
tween formalized property rights to land and economic growth in a large panel of countries
over more than 1000 years. Our analysis is based on a novel data set, tracing historical varia-
tion in formal land rights within contemporary country borders.1 We document the emergence
1We recognize that whereas some modern countries such as Sweden or Japan have had relatively fixed borders
across the centuries, many other country borders have changed numerous times over the years. We argue that
our choice to stick to countries within contemporary borders as the unit of analysis, makes our study more
comparable to several other studies that follow the same approach, for instance Borcan et al. (2018)’s study
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and evolution of state-administered cadasters (i.e. centralized land records of ownership by
individuals as well as by communal groups or legal entities) for 159 countries between 1000
CE and 2015, ranging from China’s introduction of comprehensive cadastral records already in
1000, Sweden’s reform of the 1530s and Vietnam’s in the 1470s, to a whole range of countries
like the Republic of Congo, Turkmenistan and North Korea that by 2015 had still not adopted
any cadaster. We also observe reversals when existing cadastral institutions have been either
purposefully abandoned (like in the Ottoman empire (c.1600) or Russia (c.1650)) or destroyed
in conflict (like in Cambodia or Laos in the 1970s).
We then analyze the association between cadastral institutions and long-run economic
growth in a cross-country panel stretching back to medieval times. An obvious concern in
cross-country work on the causal linkages between institutions and economic development is
endogeneity. Whereas institutional reforms often lead to economic growth, periods of stag-
nation might also initiate institutional reforms. Our strategy in this regard is to mimic the
baseline specification of the well-known dynamic model in Acemoglu et al. (2019), where a
binary indicator of democracy rather than cadastral institutions is leveraged against income
levels and growth.2 This empirical strategy allows us to focus on within-country variation while
also controlling for pre-trends in GDP, year-specific general shocks, etc.
We find that in our preferred specification, covering the 1950-2015 period, a transition
from no cadastral system at all to a full cadaster (i.e. a mapped cadaster, covering the entire
territory of the country) is associated with a 2.16 percentage point immediate increase in
the level of GDP per capita. Such drastic cadastral reforms are however rarely observed in
history. Considering instead a more typical partial reform (for instance, the launch of a cadaster
covering part of the country’s territory or a move from a narrative to a mapped cadaster), our
estimates imply an instantaneous increase in GDP per capita of 0.65 percent. The estimates
are generally measured with precision, economically meaningful and robust to the inclusion of
alternative measures of GDP, lagged values of our cadaster variable, and potential confounders
such as democracy and population density.
of the economic importance of the length of state history or most papers within the empirical cross-country
growth literature.
2We acknowledge that in cross-country income levels or growth regressions, it is nearly impossible to fully
account for the universe of potentially relevant omitted variables and we do not claim the associations that we
have uncovered should necessarily be interpreted as strictly causal.
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We then introduce our Cadaster indicator to the cross-country panel data from Acemoglu
et al. (2019). Having replicated their main within-country analsysis regarding the impact
of democracy on economic growth in 1960-2010, we show that our Cadaster index remains
significant after the inclusion of both institutional variables, suggesting a separate channel
of impact of cadasters on economic development from political rights. When we employ the
same calculation of long-run effects as in Acemoglu et al. (2019), we find that a full reform
is associated with an 53 percent increase in GDP levels in the long run, as compared to the
21 percent increase in GDP from the introduction of Acemoglu et al. (2019)’s indicator of
democracy. In order to probe deeper into these dynamics, we conduct an in-depth event study
of the four countries with the longest (predating 1500 CE) available time series for GDP per
capita: the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands. We find that cadastral
reforms to be associated with increased growth rates of GDP per capita in all countries, but
Sweden. The country case studies also illustrate that cadastral reforms like those in Napoleonic
France in 1807 often occur simultaneously with other reforms, which makes it challenging to
isolate a causal effect of an individual reform.3
We also examine two intermediate mechanisms from cadastral reforms to economic growth:
the natural real interest rate and the investment ratio to GDP. In an event study of a few
countries with novel time series data on historical real interest rates since medieval times, we
find that cadastral reforms were associated with substantial increases in the real interest rate
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, suggesting a relatively strong boost in rural in-
vestment demand. We further find that the investment ratio increased by about 1.1 percentage
points five years after a full reform. This lagged impact of investment on GDP suggests that
the observed immediate positive response from cadastral reforms on income levels must derive
from some other source.
There is a very large literature on the economic impact of property rights institutions. Exist-
ing theoretical approaches, summarized by Besley & Ghatak (2010), suggest that well-defined
property rights affect the level of economic prosperity enjoyed by individuals and countries
through at least five distinctive pathways. First and foremost, because the lack of well-defined
3Although we have not studied this in detail, the same problem should apply to any analysis of causal
impacts of democratic or other institutional reforms.
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property rights is associated with insecurity – “a random probability of loss of future income
due to conflicting challenges” (Gardner & Rausser, 2001, p. 296) – well-defined property rights
assure economic agents that they will able to appropriate returns on their labour and capital,
thereby incentivizing them to make productivity-enhancing, long-term investments. Second,
property rights free up reduce resources used to protect property, thereby channelling resources
into productive economic activity. Third, they facilitate market transactions: clear and en-
forceable property rights improve trade in assets and goods. Fourth, clear property rights and
credible contract enforcement improve the efficiency of allocation of scarce resources, enabling
them to flow to the most efficient owner. Fifth, they increase productivity by facilitating access
to credit: where property rights are clear and easily enforceable credit organizations are more
likely to accept an asset as collateral for a loan.
Similarly to generalized property rights, formal property rights in land increase investment
incentives, decrease transaction costs associated with private protection of land assets and
settle land disputes, increase the number of transactions in the land market and land value, as
land assets reach those who value it the most, and improve the collateralizability of land assets
(Besley, 1995; De Soto, 2000; Di Falco et al., 2020; Fenske, 2011; Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010;
Libecap & Lueck, 2011a; Yoo & Steckel, 2016).
It is broadly recognized that the state plays a pivotal role in creating well-defined property
rights to land (Besley & Ghatak, 2010, p. 4526-4527). The introduction of national cadastral
surveys have historically been part of a central government’s broader ambition to impose di-
rect rather than indirect rule over its territory (Scott, 1998) and to improve its fiscal capacity
through fiscal centralization (Dincecco & Katz, 2016). The state has an advantage in describ-
ing land assets and ascribing rights associated with these assets in a unified manner, thereby
reducing the information asymmetries between economic agents with and without local knowl-
edge and triggering the mechanisms discussed above that link property rights with growth.
For example, parts of the U.S. state of Ohio that fell under a state-mandated standardized
system of describing land parcels (under the Land Ordinance of 1785), experienced more land
market transactions, more mortgages and higher land value, than parts of Ohio where the
boundaries of land parcels were defined locally and haphazardly with reference to features of
local geography and man-made structures (Libecap & Lueck, 2011a).
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Formalization of property rights over land may have both immediate and long-term effects.
For example, following the introduction of land registration in 1905 in the Japanese colony of
Taiwan, the number of land parcels changing hands through sales increased from 4,499 in 1905
to 51,137 in 1906 and the number of land parcels registered as collateral increased from 4,848
to 43,731 correspondingly (Yoo & Steckel, 2016, p. 639). Within two years after a similar
reform by the Japanese colonial government in Korea in 1918, the amount of loans using land
as collateral increased three-fold (Yoo & Steckel, 2016, p. 638). A natural experiment in the
allocation of land titles among squatters in poor areas of Buenos Aires showed that households
that moved from usufructuary land rights to full property rights promptly and substantially
increased investments in their houses, the education of their children and experienced a modest
improvement in access to mortgage (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010). Growth-enhancing effects
of the formalization of property rights may persist over the long-run either because of the
“advantage of an early start” (Bockstette et al., 2002) or due to the persistence of characteristics
of the initial property defining institutions (for example, centralized vs decentralized) through
path dependent channels as shown by Libecap & Lueck (2011a).
Despite strong theoretical arguments, the empirical literature does not uniformly support
the proposition of the positive economic effects from the formalization of property rights in
land. For instance, Besley et al. (2012) analyze the “de Soto” effect (associated with De Soto
(2000)), which postulates that property rights strengthen incentives for using fixed assets as
collateral, which in turn should lead to lower interest rates and greater profits. Using micro
evidence from Sri Lanka, the authors show that the positive effects of formalization of property
rights depend on whether the credit market is competitive or not. An influential survey of
existing empirical research on the effects of land administration interventions reports strong,
“albeit not uniform” (Deininger & Feder, 2009, p. 233), evidence that formalization of land
property rights is associated with higher levels of investment and productivity, reduced need
to defend land rights, increased rental market activity, but less so with access to credit. A
further survey of this literature (Place, 2009) characterizes the empirical results as mixed.
A more recent meta-analysis of 54 quantitative studies on the relationship between property
rights in land and investment in Africa (Fenske, 2011) shows that the literature is dominated
by micro-level studies (at the level of household level or below) and plagued with a number of
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methodological issues, such as small sample sizes, the use of binary investment measures and
a variety of ambiguous proxies for formalization of property rights and security of tenure.
Existing empirical research clearly lacks a large comparative study on the macro level, and
our paper closes this gap by introducing a data set that traces the evolution of formal property
rights in land at the country level over 1000 years and by providing the first analysis of the
growth effects of cadastral reforms.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the conceptual framework behind our
empirical modelling; in section 3, we present the new data, including the coding that guided
its construction and general trends in the Cadaster indicator; section 4 outlines our empirical
strategy and reports the main results; in section 5 we carry out econometric analysis of two
potential mechanisms linking cadastral reforms with economic growth. The last sections reflect
on the limitations of the analysis and conclude with the take-home message of this research
and avenues for future work.
2 Conceptual Framework
This section briefly outlines the simple conceptual framework for our empirical analysis. Let
us assume that there are two basic sectors: a large rural sector where land is a key input
and an urban sector, specializing in trade and finance and that does not use land. The point
of departure is a standard micro-founded macro model where rural investment demand is a
negative function of the real interest rate r = i− π where i is the nominal interest rate and π
is the inflation rate. Our key agent is a representative rural economic enterprise that uses land
as an input, such as an individual farm, a village council, a water mill, a religious institution
or, after industrialization, a private manufacturing firm. What we call an economic enterprise
might thus either be a single individual or a collective agent as in collectivist China. Enterprises
hire capital K at a cost rK and trade off the marginal cost r of hiring an extra unit against the
value marginal product of capital, i.e. its marginal contribution to total revenue. A lower real
interest rate implies a higher optimal employment of capital and a higher level of investment
demand, as shown in Figure 1. Since a higher level of investment gives rise to a higher level of
capital, K is also associated with a higher level of aggregate production in the economy Y.
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S is urban supply of credit to rural economic enterprises. The higher the real interest rate,
the more willing are urban households are to forgo current consumption and instead save for
the future. Savings are assumed to be channeled to credit market institutions that supply
credit to rural enterprises. The higher the real interest rate, the higher the supply of credit
that is channeled from urban households via credit market institutions to rural enterprises,
as shown by the positive slope in Figure 1. In general, the slope and position of the S -curve
reflects the quality of credit market institutions such that the curve will be placed further to
the right in the case of well-functioning institutions.
In equilibrium, the crossing of the I- and S-curves determine the real natural interest rate
as in standard macro models. In the initial situation, the curves cross at a real natural interest
rate of r0 and at a level of investment of I0.
Figure 1: Investment demand and supply of credits as a function of the real interest rate
Note: The figure illustrates the real natural interest rate as an equilibrium between investment demand
and supply of collateralized credit.
Let us now assume that a government cadastral reform — that records the boundaries of
land parcels and rights and obligations associated with these parcels to land — is introduced
in the country. As discussed above, such a reform will likely lead to a number of effects. One
impact, which might be referred to as “de Soto effect” (Besley et al., 2012; De Soto, 2000),
suggests that formalization of property rights to land implies that real estate assets can be used
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as collateral in credit applications. This provides a stronger security to lenders who become
more willing to supply credit at a given real interest rate. If there are well-functioning credit
market institutions, this results in a shift of the S-curve to the right. The level of investment
increases to I1 and the equilibrium real natural interest rate falls.
However, even at a given level of credit supply, a cadastral reform should also usually
increase rural enterprises’ willingness to invest. If the main rural economic enterprises are
individual farms, a cadaster with officially recorded maps of individual property should give
farmers a stronger confidence that their assets are not going to be confiscated or predated
upon by the government or by private agents. In the case that such problems still arise, land
owners whose assets and rights are recorded in cadastral records, have a higher probability of
attaining a corrective decision in a court than land owners with informal property rights over
their assets.4 The increased willingness to invest is reflected in a shift of the I-curve to the
right in Figure 1. Such a shift will lead to a further increased level of investment to I2 > I1. In
the example in Figure 1, the net effect of the cadastral reform on the natural real interest rate
is an increase to r2. However, this will depend on whether the de Soto effect or the investment
effect dominates. In either case, our conceptual framework suggests that investment should
increase and hence the capital stock and levels of aggregate production Y.
Country-wide cadastral records are organized by a central government, often with the pur-
pose of achieving a more efficient generation of tax revenues from land assets (Kain & Baigent,
1992; Scott, 1998). In this sense, the emergence of national systems of cadastral records is
seen as part of a broader historical ambition of states to improve their fiscal capacity through
centralization of state revenue (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2018; Dincecco & Katz, 2016). If tax
revenues increase as a result of the more detailed recording of private (and public) land, this
should in turn lead to a greater provision of public goods such as roads, schools, and law enforce-
ment.5 Hence, cadastral reforms often have indirect macro-level effects beyond the investment
and credit decisions at micro level.
The theoretical account above is necessarily stylized and highly simplified. In reality, the
4In the case where the relevant economic enterprise was a collective agent such as a farmer cooperative, laws
regarding the rights of legal entities might prohibit efficient credit arrangements.
5It should be recognized that fiscal reforms are often carried out with the main objective of raising more
revenue for military spending (Tilly, 1990a), which do not have a straightforward link to increasing prosperity.
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imposition of cadastral systems also had significant direct and indirect costs. A direct cost
was the resources required for state bureaucrats to survey land holdings, record land rights
and continuously administer these records, especially in a pre-satellite and pre-computer era.
Indirect costs of cadasters included the break-up of informal arrangements of land sharing and
grazing on commons, evolved over centuries in accordance with local traditions and needs. In
many places, cadastral and other reforms by a “seeing state” that aspired to measure, catego-
rize, standardize, tax, and centrally plan its hinterland, were often met with local resistance
(Scott, 1998). In order to evade taxation, people in Southeast Asia even migrated to frontier
territories or to other countries (Scott, 2009). Such costs may have had a dampening effect on
economic growth.
In the empirical section, we will study the reduced-form impact of cadastral reform on
output per capita within countries across time. We will also analyze whether the mechanism
runs through the real natural interest rate and aggregate investment levels.
3 The Cadaster Indicator
3.1 Constructing the Indicator
Empirical research on the effects of property rights in land has been hampered by the scarcity of
suitable indicators. The micro-level research has predominantly relied on subjective indicators
(Besley, 1995; Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010), and the lack of data on property rights in land
for countries has precluded comparative empirical research at the cross-country level.6 We
address this empirical gap in the multidisciplinary literature by developing a new measure of
formal property rights in land based on the presence and characteristics of state-administered
cadastral records.
Cadaster are records, containing, first, a description of land assets and, second, a description
of interests – rights, restrictions and obligations – associated with the asset (Williamson &
Enermark, 1996). One part of a cadastral record contains information that uniquely identifies
land parcel – its location, dimensions and features – obtained through an external observation,
6For example, the International Property Rights Index (IPRI ), a comprehensive measure of property rights
around the world, does not feature rights in land as a component of the index.
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usually a survey of land. This information is linked with a record of individuals (or groups of
people, such as communal groups or legal entities) and their rights and obligations with regard
to the land asset.7 These attributes make cadaster a suitable indicator of the formalization
of property rights in land (Libecap & Lueck, 2011a; Yoo & Steckel, 2016). Furthermore,
although the exact forms of land surveying and registration have changed due to technological
development, their essence – demarcation of land assets and registration and codification of the
rights (of individuals, communities, and legal entities) to perform certain actions with regard
to these assets – has not. This attribute of cadaster has facilitated the creation of an indicator
over a long period of time.
To create the Cadaster variable we assigned a score for each country/year, based on the
answers to the following questions:
• “Was there a state-administered cadaster?” Country/year receives 1 point if “yes” and
0 points if “no”, yielding score component 1 (z1it);
• “Was the cadaster narrative or cartographic?”. Country/year receives 1 if cartographic
and 0.75 if narrative, yielding score component 2 (z2it); Figure 2 shows examples of nar-
rative (left panel) and cartographic (right panel) cadasters;
• “How much of the country’s territory was covered by the cadaster?”. Country/year
receives a score based on the proportion of the country’s territory covered by the cadaster,
yielding score component 3 (z3it). If cadaster covers more than 90 percent of the territory,
the score is 1.
These coding principals allow us to account for spatial and temporal change, including
discontinuation of cadasters such as, for instance, in the Ottoman empire c. 1600 and Russia c.
1656 (Figure 3). These examples demonstrate that it cannot be assumed that once commenced
cadaster institutions would inevitably persist. Therefore, special care was taken in documenting
the presence and attributes — type of cadaster and the spatial coverage — of cadasters at every
t of the period.
7Usually cadasters register the interests of individuals, but there are also examples of cadasters that are not
predicated on individual property rights: such as the Soviet cadaster or cadasters of communal lands (such as
under Kenya’s 2016 Community Land Act).
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Figure 2: Left Panel: Narrative cadaster, Novgorod, Russia, 1571; Right panel: Cartographic
cadaster, Uppsala, Sweden, 1635
Note: Images from Wikimedia Commons (nd) and The Swedish National Land Survey (Lantmäteriet).
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Note: The figures show the evolution of Cadaster indicator, measured on the vertical axis, in Russia
(left panel) and Turkey (right panel) in 1000-2015.
To this end, we used several thousand sources of information in different languages, the
major of which are:
• The Cadastral Template project — a collection of standardised descriptions of the his-
torical cadasters and contemporary land registration projects in 60 countries around the
globe, carried out by the International Federation of Land Surveyors (FIG);
• Documents from the Permanent Committee on Cadastre in the European Union (PCC )
and its Latin American counterpart - the Comité Permanente sobre el Catastro en
Iberoamérica (CPCI );
• Specialised scientific literature, examining cadasters historically and/or presently, such
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as Kain & Baigent (1992), which provides a thick description of historical cadastres
for a large number of European states, or Erba (2008) and Bosch Llombart (2007) on
the history and modern situation with cadasters in the countries of Latin and Central
America;
• Reports by governments and international organisations, involved in land registration
projects (e.g. African Development Bank, Development Bank of Latin America, USIAD,
World Bank and others).
The coding principals went through a peer review by process (D’Arcy et al., 2019), receiving
the approval of the professional association of land surveyors.
We compute the Cadaster indicator for every country/year by multiplying all three score
components by one another:
Cadasterit = z
1
it × z2it × z3it
The possible range of values is 0 to 1, where “0” stands for no state-administered cadaster
at all and “1” stands for a full (covering at least 90 percent of the territory) mapped cadaster.
Appendix A describes in detail the principles of coding and illustrates the coding process.
Accompanying this paper is also an online Dates and Sources Appendix — a 90+ page long
document that provides a comprehensive description of the coding decisions with supporting
references for all country/year observations.
3.2 A Brief Looks at the Data
The resulting data – Cadaster – is an annual unbalanced panel that comprises 159 modern-day
countries from 1000 to 2015.8 We observe a considerable range in Cadaster scores. China has
the earliest history of comprehensive cadasters: a nationwide narrative cadastral survey took
place in 2AD and the first cartographic description of land assets was conducted in 1143 (Zhao,
1986, p. 69). In 1400 the Ottomans took over the practice of land records (tahrir defterleri)
8Our unit of analysis is countries in their present-day borders. For a discussion on borders endogeneity,
please see (Borcan et al., 2018). Collecting data for the anterior period would require high research effort for
low quality data due to the poor preservation of historical records. There are also very few examples of known
cadasters before 1000.
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from the Byzantine empire, which kept land registers (kodix ) from c. 995 AD (Gregory et al.,
1991, p. 363), only to abandon it c. 1600 until the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, which re-
instituted cadaster, but with a limited coverage. Sweden was the first European country to
have a comprehensive mapped cadastre beginning in 1628 with considerable immediate and
long-term benefits (Nistotskaya & D’Arcy, 2018).
Figure 4 depicts regional averages of Cadaster from 1000 to 2015, revealing a number of
interesting patterns. First, there is no meaningful cadastral development until the late medieval
period when cadastral records begin to emerge in parts of Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
This development plateaus in Asia from the 1600s to the 1800s, and falls back in Europe and
the Middle East around 1600, as the Ottoman empire begins its slow decline. While European
scores begin to recover in the 1700s and increase consistently, the Middle East does not increase
its score until the 1800s. The Western off-shoots rapidly increase their scores from the mid
1800s, quickly reaching maximum possible values, and at the end of the period their average
score is higher than that of Europe. Africa and Latin America begin cadastrefication in the
twentieth century, and are the world regions with the lowest Cadaster values presently.
The summation of the Cadaster scores over all years for a country gives an indication of
the country’s accumulated experience of formal property rights to land.9 Figure 5 shows a
histogram of the aggregate score for each modern country over the 1000-2015 period. China
and Egypt stand out in the right-hand side of the figure with 980 and 613 “total years” (i.e. the
sum of Cadaster scores for all years) respectively. A group of countries, consisting of Sweden,
Finland, Vietnam, Japan and Austria, have total years between 419-461 years, whereas the
great majority of today’s countries have a very short or no history of cadastral records, to the
far left. The median Cadaster aggregate score for the whole period is 44.9 years.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we analyze the quantitative relationship between the evolution of cadastral
records and economic growth since 1000 CE. Our main hypothesis is that of a positive rela-
tionship between the existence of cadastral records and economic growth. In the introduction
9Such a measure can be compared with the aggregated State history measure in (Borcan et al., 2018).
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Note: The figures show the time series of Cadaster for six world regions between in 1000-2015
and in the conceptual framework, we reviewed the rationales for such a hypothesis, many of
which find empirical support in micro studies such as Besley (1995), Galiani & Schargrodsky
(2010), Libecap & Lueck (2011a): increased investment, reduction in the resources needed to
defend one’s land, facilitation of land market transactions, higher value of land and better
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Figure 5: Distribution of aggregate Cadaster scores across 157 countries
China: 980 yearsEgypt: 613 years
Sweden, Finland, Vietnam, Japan, Austria: 419-461 years
Median: 44.9 years
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Note: The figure shows a histogram of the distribution of the aggregate “total years” with full cadaster
scores (Cadaster=1) for 157 countries. The data is constructed by summing up all country-year
Cadaster scores for each country.
access to credit.
4.1 Long-run economic growth
Finding reliable data on economic growth all the way back to 1000 CE posits a great challenge.
Two of the most commonly used data bases on economic growth – the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and the Penn World Tables – only go back at most to 1950. The
standard source of data on long-run economic growth in the literature has been the time
series data developed by Angus Maddison and his collaborators in the Maddison Project. The
Maddison Project’s database was updated in 2018, incorporating a number of new and revised
time series of national income and growth levels over several centuries (Bolt et al., 2018). We
use the Maddison Project’s database from 2018, thereafter referred to as MPD 2018, as our
primary data source.
As our outcome variable, we use annual real GDP per capita for all available years back to
1000 CE. This measure is available for an unbalanced panel from 4 observations in the year
15
1000 to 153 observations in 2015. The longest consecutive annual time series on GDP per
capita levels are those of the United Kingdom (from 1252), France (1280), Sweden (1300) and
the Netherlands (1348). MPD 2018 provides two main time series of real GDP per capita:
CGDPpc and RGDPNApc. Both series are expressed in 2011 US dollars. However, in con-
structing CGDPpc, the researchers allow (implicit) relative prices used for the cross-country
comparisons to differ over time. The primary advantage of this measure is that it allows for
more reliable comparisons of standards of living across countries during a given year. On the
other hand, RGDPNApc follows the traditional methodology in previous versions of the MPD,
where the growth rates of GDP per capita track the growth rates given in the National Ac-
counts. Furthermore, RGDPNApc relies on a single cross-country price comparison for 2011
(Bolt et al., 2018, p. 5). CGDPpc is thus primarily suitable for cross-country income lev-
els comparisons, whereas RGDPNApc is more suitable for comparing growth rates over time.
In other words, the RGDPNApc series is the most suitable for studying the within-country
variation in growth rates, which is the main reason why we use it as our primary outcome vari-
able. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the two series among 17,090 annual country-year
observations in our sample is 0.938.
To get a first sense of the general static cross-country association between the existence
of a cadastral system and contemporary levels of economic development, Figure 6 shows a
scatter plot with log GDP per capita (CGDPpc from MDP 2018 ) on the vertical axis and
Cadaster on the horizontal axis for 145 countries with available data in the year 2000. Two
things are noteworthy: first, that the distribution of Cadaster is bimodal in character with a
great number of countries having a full cadaster score = 1 and many countries having a score
at 0, as well as a number of countries in a transition between the two modes. Second, there
is a very clear positive correlation between income per capita and the existence of cadastral
institutions. On average, countries with a full cadastral system have a GDP per capita that is
about 225 percent higher than countries without a cadastral system.10
However, there are many reasons for why such an association should not necessarily be in-
terpreted as a causal relationship. For instance, there might be reverse causality since countries
with greater income levels might have more available resources to create a cadastral system. It
10If we fit a linear regression line, the coefficient would be roughly 2.25 with a t-value> 13 and a R2 = 0.55
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Note: The figure shows a scatter plot of log GDP per capita on the vertical axis (measured by
the CGDPpc-series for cross-country comparisons in MDP 2018) and our Cadaster indicator, both
measured in the year 2000.
might also be the case that some omitted variable X – say a change in agricultural technology
– actually drive both income levels and cadastral institutions.
To address this issue we exploit a dynamic model for GDP per capita where we can control
for country and year fixed effects, as well as for trends in GDP levels before a cadastral reform,
as our primary research design. Such a dynamic model can be specified in a number of differ-
ent ways. In order to ”tie our hands” against the temptation of using a dynamic model that
gives us the most clear-cut results, we chose to adopt the basic empirical strategy of a strongly
related paper published recently in the Journal of Political Economy (Acemoglu et al., 2019).
In that paper, the main independent variable is a dichotomous institutional variable (Democ-
racy), constructed in a way similar to our Cadaster indicator. The main difference is that our
institutional variable is documented for a much longer period, which makes it necessary for
us to use a different source of GDP data (MPD 2018, rather than World Development Indica-
tors). As discussed above, our Cadaster indicator also has intermediate steps (introduction of
a narrative cadaster, etc).
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4.2 Main results: Income level regressions
Our first and main econometric specification is given in equation (1) where yit is the level of
log GDP per capita in country i in year t, Cit is our Cadaster indicator, αi is a country fixed
effect, δt is a year fixed effect, and εit is an error term that includes all other time-varying
effects on GDP per capita. As usual, we assume that past levels of yit and Cit are orthogonal
to εit. Note that we would expect that δt captures worldwide year-specific effects (for instance,
an international downturn in the business cycle) and that αi will absorb the effect of time
invariant country characteristics, such as geographical factors, in the usual manner. Just as
Acemoglu et al. (2019), we include up to L = 8 lags of the dependent variable in our regressions
with γl being the estimated coefficient for lag l ≤ 8. The lag structure is put in place in order
to eliminate the residual serial correlation in the error term, but also to control for pre-trends
to ensure that countries that experience a cadastral reform (i.e. a change in the level of Cit)
are not on a different trend relative to other countries with similar historical levels of GDP in
the recent past. The lagged values of yit are further assumed to pick up the impact of a range
socio-economic factors that may have impacted on both GDP and Cadaster. Such confounding
factors might, for example, be levels of agricultural technology or productivity. The main
parameter of interest in (1) is β, which we expect to be positive. If we, for instance, consider a
cadastral reform leading to a change in Cit from 0 to 1, the interpretation is that β shows the
percentage increase in GDP per capita in year t that results from that reform.
yit = βCit +
L∑
l=1
γt−lyt−l + αi + δt + εit (1)
What is the long-term impact of such a drastic cadastral reform? As described in Acemoglu
et al. (2019), the cumulative effect of a reform several years ahead can be described by a ratio
of estimates as in equation (2):





If, for instance, β = 2 so that a full cadastral reform leads to an immediate increase in GDP
by 2 percent, and if γ1 = .98 with L = 1, then the long-run impact is estimated to be
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2/.02 = 100, i.e. the long-run effect is a doubling of GDP per capita compared to status quo.
In the regressions below, we will report this long-run calculation in all specifications based on
equation 1.
We use the standard within estimator to estimate the impact of Cadaster on GDP per
capita. The main results are shown in 1, using the log of RGDPNApc from MPD 2018 as our
dependent variable, as motivated above. Given very few country-year observations before 1500
AD, we divide up the sample in three periods that all end in 2015 but with three different
starting years; 1500, 1900 and 1950. Columns (1)-(2) show the estimates for β, multiplied by
100 so that they can be interpreted as percentages, and the coefficient for γl, using respectively
one and four lags in the dependent variable. The estimates .515 and .470 indicate that income
per capita increases with close to half a percent as an immediate result of the reform, but none
of the estimates are significant. A standard pattern in the table is further that the coefficient
for yt−1 is close to unity and significant. For this early period, systematic annual GDP per
capita data is available for four European countries.
In columns (3)-(4), we run the same regressions for the 1900-2015 period, with the sample
shrinking to 11,252 and 10,863 country-year observations respectively, but it also means that
we can follow the growth rates of many more countries (39 countries have GDP data for 1901).
The estimates for Cadaster now rise substantially to 1.68-2.00 and become significant at the 5-
percent level. Also the long-run effect is large and significant and amounts to a 68.44 percentage
increase of a permanent full reform in column (4).
From the 1950s the GDP time series data is available for more than 120 countries. The
estimates of β reach an even higher level in the range 2.16-2.95 in columns (5)-(8).11 Our
main specification with L = 4 in column (7) has a statistically significant estimate of 2.16.
The long-run impact of a full cadastral reform is an increase in GDP per capita of about 85
percent. In Table (5) we compare the long-run effect of Cadaster with that of Democracy in
Acemoglu et al (2019).
The reason that our estimates in Table 1 are quite high might be partially due to the fact
that our Cadaster variable does not have a dichotomous construction, but often moves step-
wise between 0 and 1, as shown in some of the graphs above. In total, our data record 261
11In column (8), we include eight lags of the dependent variable.
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Table 1: Effect of Cadaster on (Log) GDP per capita, 1500-2015
Dependent variable:
Log GDP per capita
1500-2015 1900-2015 1950-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cadaster .515 .470 2.00** 1.68** 2.95*** 2.49*** 2.16*** 2.28***
(.544) (.502) (.861) (.712) (1.05) (.846) (.815) (.856)
yt−1 .979*** 1.05*** .981*** 1.14*** .981*** 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.20***
(.003) (.027) (.003) (.025) (.003) (.038) (.035) (.040)
yt−2 -.058** -.119*** -.223*** -.132*** -.164***
(.024) (.030) (.037) (.044) (.048)
yt−3 .012 -.020 -.026 -.014
(.024) (.026) (.032) (.027)
yt−4 -.031* -.023 -.051*** -.057***
(.017) (.019) (.017) (.021)
Long-run 25.00 19.53 104.06** 68.44** 159.16*** 111.85*** 85.46*** 76.23***
effect (26.27) (20.53) (41.83) (27.76) (50.49) (34.38) (29.99) (27.28)
N 15,550 15,050 11,252 10,863 9032 8928 8719 8288
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Note: This table presents the within estimates of the effect of Cadaster on log GDP per capita for
three different time intervals. The reported coefficient for Cadaster is multiplied by 100. Estimates
of all included lags of log GDP per capita are included in all columns except in column (8) where we
include 8 lags of yt. Standard errors, clustered on country level, in parentheses. In each specification,
we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. Unbalanced panel including up to 150
countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
larger changes in the Cadaster (greater than an absolute change of 0.1 in either direction) and
a drastic change from 0 to 1 has only happened on 40 occasions in history. The mean level of
change in the index is around 0.3. Using the estimate in column (7), a typical partial reform,
increasing the level of Cadaster by 0.3, would lead to an instantaneous increase in GDP per
capita by 0.65 percent.
4.3 Growth regressions
Our second empirical strategy is to first-difference the income levels equation in (1) and instead
run regressions with the growth rate of GDP per capita as the dependent variable. This
is equivalent to allowing for GDP to have a unit root. More specifically, the econometric
equation that we employ is given by equation (3). As before, we control for between 1-8 lags
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of the dependent variable, year and country fixed effects and study the same time period. The
dependent variable is yt − yt−1 = ∆yt which is equivalent to an annual growth rate since yt is
the log of GDP.
∆yit = βCit +
L∑
l=1
γt−l∆yit−l + αi + δt + εit (3)
Table 2 reports the results from a standard within estimation procedure. The estimates
for the 1500-2015 period are positive, but not significant. The coefficients for Cadaster for
the 1900-2015 period are positive, around 1.60 in magnitude and significant at the 5-percent
level. As was the case in Table 1, the coefficients rise in the later period 1950-2015 to range
between 1.82-2.07, depending on the number of lags in the dependent variable included. In
the main specification in column (7), a full cadastral reform increases the GDP growth rate by
1.86 percentage points, which is a sizeable effect. A comparison of the estimates of the effects
of full cadaster to those of full democracy in Acemoglu et al. (2019), obtained using identical
specification, suggests that the effects are of a similar magnitude (1.86 vs 1.27 percentage
points), with the impact of cadastral reform being once again higher. A mean level of cadastral
reform of 0.3 is associated with an increase in growth rates by 0.56 percentage points.
4.4 Robustness
In this subsection of the empirical analysis, we briefly check the robustness of our main results
in Table 1. Our first approach is to analyze: (i) whether cadastral reforms influence income
levels with a lag, as is the case with the investment share (Table 3), (ii) whether a different
binary indicator of a full cadastral system changes results, and (iii) whether the estimate of
our cadaster indicator remains significant when we include additional country- and year-specific
control variables commonly used in the literature.
Table 3 reports the results of this exercise, where the first three columns check the impact
of lagged levels of Cadaster. The coefficient of Cadaster becomes insignificant already with
two lags, and gradually decreases from column (1) to column (3). This suggests that the main
effect of a cadastral reform is immediate rather than deferred.
We mentioned earlier that the main study that we compare with, i.e. Acemoglu et al. (2019),
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Table 2: Effect of Cadaster on the growth rate of GDP per capita, 1500-2015
Dependent variable:
Growth rate of real GDP per capita
1500-2015 1900-2015 1950-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cadaster .520 .550 1.63** 1.60** 2.07** 1.97** 1.86** 1.82**
(.469) (.471) (.740) (.776) (.856) (.867) (.881) (.921)
∆yt−1 .065** .068** .153*** .154*** .214*** .203*** .207*** .225***
(.028) (.028) (.026) (.027) (.038) (.035) (.038) (.040)
∆yt−2 .008 .031 .070** .067** .054*
(.021) (.022) (.030) (.031) (.030)
∆yt−3 .016 .006 .034* .041**
(.017) (.019) (.018) (.017)
∆yt−4 -.001 -.002 -.009 -.018
(.011) (.013) (.013) (.013)
N 15,382 14,884 11,121 10,734 8928 8824 8612 8180
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Note: This table presents the within estimates of the effect of Cadaster on the growth rate of GDP
per capita for three different time intervals. The reported coefficient for Cadaster is multiplied by 100.
Estimates of all included lags of the growth rate of GDP per capita are reported in all columns except
in column (8) where we use 8 lags of yt. Standard errors, clustered on country level, in parentheses.
In each specification, we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. Unbalanced panel
including up to 150 countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
used a dichotomous democracy variable as their main independent variable of interest, whereas
our Cadaster indicator can assume several values ranging from 0 and 1, depending on the type of
cadaster and the completeness of reform. In column (4), we introduce a dichotomous indicator
equal to 1 when the country attains complete cadastral institutions (i.e. Cadaster = 1). As
expected, the estimate in column (4) falls to 1.39 from 2.16 in column (1) with a p-value of
0.075. The long-run effect, calculated as in equation 2, would suggest an increase in GDP levels
of 54.9 percent. This is still larger than the long-run effect of democracy in Acemoglu et al.
(2019), but much closer to their estimate of 21 percent.
In column (5), we include one of the most commonly used variables for measuring the level of
democracy – Polity2 from the Polity IV dataset – ranging between +10 for full democracies to
-10 for full autocracies (Marshall et al., 2019). One might be concerned that cadastral reforms
could potentially pick up the signal from democratizations, which is the key institutional change
of interest in Acemoglu et al. (2019). In column (5) we see that the estimate for Cadaster does
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Table 3: Robustness analysis I: Lagged levels of Cadaster and time varying control variables,
1950-2015
Dependent variable:
Log GDP per capita 1950-2015
Lags in Cadaster Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cadaster(t) 2.16*** 2.64*** 2.72** 2.86*** 3.52*** 3.03***











Log Pop. dens. -.018*** -.030***
(.006) (.007)
Infant mortality -.000** -.000***
(.000) (.000)
yt, lags 1-4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
N 8719 8732 8745 9069 7591 7509 6818 6704 6502
Countries 150 150 150 153 148 145 147 147 147
Note: The table reports the within estimates of the effect of different lags of Cadaster and a standard
set of control variables on log GDP per capita for the 1950-2015 period. Unbalanced panel including
145-153 countries. The reported coefficients for Cadaster are multiplied by 100. All specifications
contain four lags of Log GDP per capita (not reported) and country and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
not change substantially and remains significant whereas Polity2 has no discernible effect.
The same effect is observed for an alternative variable for liberal democracy from the V-Dem
Institute (Coppedge et al., 2019) that we utilize in column (6).
Could it be the case that cadastral reforms are somehow related to population density so
that reforms become necessary when population pressures are very high? There is indeed a
positive correlation between population density and the strength of cadastral institutions in
our sample. In column (7), log population density has a negative and significant impact on log
GDP per capita but the coefficient for Cadaster remains of similar magnitudes as before and
is significant when population density is included.
One might be concerned that cadastral reforms just happen to be rolled out at the same
time as other reforms that reflect an increasing state capacity that is the true driver of increases
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in income per capita. One candidate for such a scenario is a country’s health infrastructure.
In column (8) we include infant mortality per 1000 live births as a proxy for state capacity
in health care. Interestingly, the estimate for Cadaster rises even when infant mortality is
included. As expected, years with a high infant mortality are associated with lower levels of
GDP per capita within countries. In column (9) the estimates for all three control variables –
regime type, population density and state capacity – are statistically significant, and Cadaster
remains around 3 and its positive impact is measured with precision.
As our second approach to checking robustness, we replace the CGDPpc indicator of GDP
per capita from Table 1 with RGDPNApc. As discussed above, the latter is constructed in
a somewhat different way in order to be mainly suitable for cross-country income levels com-
parisons during a particular year. We include this variable in a robustness analysis (Table 4),
where all specifications are otherwise identical to those in Table 1.
The results in Table 4 are somewhat striking in the sense that the estimates of our Cadaster
variable are higher and with higher t-values throughout than in Table 1. For instance, the es-
timate in column (2) indicates that GDP per capita tended to increase by 1.36 percent in
response to a full cadastral reform already during the 1500-2015 period. In the main specifica-
tion in column (7), the coefficient for Cadaster is 4.67 and the long-run effect of introducing
a cadastral institution is an increase in GDP of 136 percent (compared to 85 percent in the
same column in Table 1). The effect seems implausibly high and could potentially be due to
the difference in the price deflator between the two time series.
As a third robustness check, we use the same data as Acemoglu et al. (2019). This limits
our analysis to a shorter time period from 1960, but allows us to directly compare the esti-
mates for their Democracy variable with our Cadaster variable. Table 5 reports the results of
this analysis. Columns (1)-(2) replicate Acemoglu et al. (2019)’s specifications in columns (1)
and (3) Table 2. When we instead introduce Cadaster in columns (3)-(4) in otherwise identi-
cal specifications (but with fewer country-year observations), the coefficients are substantially
higher and are significant at least at the 10-percent level. The long-run effect is a 53.25 percent
increase in GDP per capita (column (4)), which is more than double the effect of Democracy
(21.24) in column (2). If we consider a typical increase in our score by 0.3, the estimate in
column (4) implies an immediate effect of a cadastral reform of a 0.58 percent rise in GDP per
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Table 4: Robustness analysis II: Effect of Cadaster using an alternative measure of GDP per
capita, 1500-2015
Dependent variable:
Log GDP per capita (CGDPpc)
1500-2015 1900-2015 1950-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cadaster 1.45* 1.36* 3.88*** 3.54*** 5.35*** 5.11*** 4.67*** 5.08***
(.762) (.710) (1.14) (.996) (1.35) (1.23) (1.15) (1.26)
yt−1 .976*** 1.02*** .975*** 1.06*** .973*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.06***
(.003) (.020) (.003) (.020) (.004) (.025) (.023) (.025)
yt−2 -.011 -.031 -.101*** -.008 -.019
(.024) (.030) (.025) (.037) (.038)
yt−3 .008 -.021 -.024 -.023
(.025) (.027) (.032) (.032)
yt−4 -.040** -.034* -.058*** -.041*
(.016) (.017) (.018) (.024)
Long-run 61.20** 49.41** 158.33*** 119.30*** 194.79*** 169.40*** 135.79*** 119.27***
effect (30.80) (24.64) (41.59) (31.48) (43.80) (36.84) (31.41) (28.59)
N 15,279 14,777 11,254 10,863 9032 8928 8719 8288
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Note: The table reports the within estimates for Cadaster on the alternative measure of Log GDP
per capita (CGDPpc) from the Maddison dataset for three different time periods. Unbalanced panel
including up to 151 countries. The reported coefficients for Cadaster are multiplied by 100. All
models include and different lags of log GDPpc, except for column (8), where 8 lags of yt are used
(not reported). All specifications include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
capita, which is very close to the equivalent estimate at 0.65 in Table 1.
Column (5) reports the results of a “horse race” between the two institutional variables.
It is plausible to assume that there could exist collinearity between Democracy and Cadaster
(the Perason correlation is about 0.38), as democratic and cadastral reforms could be seen as
strengthening the cluster of “inclusive institutions” in a country since they both strengthen
economic rights. On the other hand, we know that such autocratic countries as China and
Vietnam have long history of cadasters but no meaningful experience of democracy. Turning to
the results, we see that both Democracy and Cadaster remain significant in column (5) and that
the coefficient for Cadaster is considerably higher. When we interact the two variables (column
(6)), Democracy is no longer significant, whereas the positive estimate for the interaction term
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Table 5: Robustness analysis III: Comparative effect of Cadaster and Democracy using data
from Acemoglu et al. (2019), 1960-2010
Dependent variable:
Log GDP per capita Growth rate GDP pc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Democracy 0.973*** 0.787*** 0.656*** 0.319 1.269*** 1.106***
(0.294) (0.226) (0.240) (0.307) (0.243) (0.313)
Cadaster 3.282** 1.943* 2.164* 1.891* 1.885* 1.967*
(1.303) (1.079) (1.129) (1.141) (1.060) (1.105)
Democracy x 0.837* 0.079
Cadaster (0.493) (0.562)
yt−l, lags 1 4 1 4 4 4
∆yt−l, lags 4 4 4
Long-run 35.59** 21.24*** 116.76** 53.25*
effect (14.00) (7.21) (46.54) (29.11)
N 6790 6336 5835 5403 5365 5365 6178 5259 5229
Countries 175 175 145 145 145 145 175 145 145
Note: The table reports the within estimates of Democracy and Cadaster, using Acemoglu et al.
(2019)’s data from 1960-2010. Unbalanced panel including up to 175 countries. The dependent
variable is Log GDP per capita in columns (1)-(6) and the Growth rate of GDP per capita in columns
(7-9). The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. All models include a varying number of lags of
the dependent variable and country and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country
level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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suggests that cadastral reforms have a stronger effect on GDP levels in democratic societies.
Lastly, in columns (7)-(9), we employ the growth rate of GDP per capita as the dependent
variable. Column (7) replicates the result for Democracy in Acemoglu et al. (2019)’s Table
3, column 3. Column (8) reports the estimate for Cadaster, which is again higher, albeit
estimated with less precision than Democracy. The interaction term between the two variables
of interest has an insignificant coefficient (Column (9)), but individually they enter statistically
significant, suggesting that Democracy and Cadaster have separate and non-complementary
effects on economic growth.
4.5 Country case studies
In this section, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the four countries with the longest available
time series for GDP per capita: the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands.12
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. All
specifications include four lags of the dependent variable in order to control for pre-trends,
in line with the preferred specifications in Tables 1-2. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) include
linear time trends to filter out the effect of potential long-run trends in the growth rate within
the period. Together with the estimates, we report the robust standard errors from an OLS
regression and the Newey-West standard errors with four lags that correct for heteroskedasticity
as well as potential autocorrelation.13
The results in Table 6 are substantively similar to those in Table 2. In United Kingdom,
where the time series has 759 annual observations, the growth rate increases by 1.32-1.8 per-
centage points as a result of a full reform.14 In France, the estimate is 1.2-1.3 and significant
at the 10-percent level. In Sweden, the overall effect is unclear, as the estimate’s sign changes
once a time trend is accounted for. The Netherlands display the strongest effect where an
increase of the Cadaster indicator from 0 to 1 is associated with a 1.86-2.93 percentage point
increase in the growth rate.
Furthermore, we examined the impact of the introduction of a full mapped cadastral system
12In all these countries, the earliest available data predate 1500 CE and several annual observations were not
included in the analyses reported above.
13Unfortunately, Newey-West standard errors are not available for France and Netherlands due to missing
data for some years.
14With Newey-West standard errors the level of significance falls.
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Table 6: Country case studies of the effect of Cadaster on the growth rate of GDP per capita,
all years
Dependent variable:
Growth rate real GDP per capita
UK France Sweden Netherlands
1252-2015 1280-2015 1300-2015 1348-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cadaster 1.80*** 1.32** 1.20* 1.30* 1.00 -2.62* 1.86** 2.93**
(.56) (.57) (.65) (.68) (.67) (1.42) (.73) (1.37)
[.74] [.71] n.a. n.a. [.63] [1.29] n.a. n.a.
∆yt−l, lags 1-4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
trend
√ √ √ √
N 759 759 696 696 711 711 652 652
R2 .12 .13 .09 .09 .04 .06 .08 .08
Note: This table reports the OLS estimates of the effect of Cadaster on the growth rate of GDP per
capita in four countries. The reported coefficients for Cadaster are multiplied by 100. All specifications
include lags of the growth rate of GDP per capita (not reported). Specifications in columns (2), (4),
(6), and (8) include a linear time trend. Robust standard errors in ()-parentheses and Newey-West
standard errors (four lags) in []-parentheses, where available. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based
on t-values from robust standard errors.
in greater detail by conducting an event analysis. Figure 7 shows the development of the five-
year moving average of growth rates of GDP per capita during a century-long window 50 years
before and after the year of transition to a full national cartographic cadaster.15 We have
included non-linear fitted regression lines with confidence intervals at 5-percent level.
Figure 7 offers several noteworthy observations. First, in all four countries the reform was
preceded by a falling trend in GDP per capita growth. Hence, we cannot rule out that cadasters
could have been introduced at least partially in response to economic and political hardships.
Second, in all countries the cadastral reform was carried out right before or during a major
war episode. While in the United Kingdom, the 1910 reform happened just before World War
I, in Sweden, the 1628 reform happened when the country was about to embark on a major
engagement in the Thirty Years War (1618-48). In France and the Netherlands the reforms
were carried out in the Napoleonic aftermath of the French Revolution, which caused a hiatus
in the recording of aggregate production statistics in both countries. These observations are in
line with a large literature, pioneered by Tilly (1990b), documenting that the strengthening of
15We focus on the year when our Cadaster indicator reaches its maximum score 1. Partial reforms (for
instance the introduction of a narrative cadaster) have often been carried out before this date. For instance,
in Sweden, narrative cadaster existed already in the 1530s, while the country transitioned to a full mapped
cadaster in 1628.
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Figure 7: Event study of full cadastral reform on average GDP growth rate per capita during
a 100-year window in the UK, France, Sweden and the Netherlands
Note: The figures show event studies during a 100-year window of a full cadastral reform in United
Kingdom (starting in 1252), France (1280), Sweden (1300), and Netherlands (1348). The vertical
axis shows a five-year moving average of growth rates in GDP per capita. The figures show fitted
polynomial regression lines with 5-percent confidence intervals before and after year of reform. France
and Netherlands have missing observations around the time of reform.
fiscal capacity in Europe was caused by the war imperative.
Third, the four reform episodes suggest that cadastral reforms are often accompanied by a
cluster of other institutional reforms. The transition to mapped cadaster in Sweden in 1628 was
only one of several institutional innovations aimed at improving the fiscal and judicial capacity
of the central government (Wetterberg, 2002). In France, the 1807 cadastral reform was carried
out at the same as the wide-ranging Code Napoleon was introduced that would serve as a model
for civil law in several countries. In the Netherlands, the reform of 1813 happened in the final
years of French dominance before the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was established in
1815 as an independent state at the Congress of Vienna. The long peace that ensued after
Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 certainly also contributed to the higher post-reform growth rates in
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France and the Netherlands.
Fourth, higher average growth rates after reform are not only found in France and the
Netherlands, but in all four countries, confirming the tendency from the results in the Table 6.
Figure A2 in the Appendix shows a similar graph for a partial reform in a developing
country, i.e. Kenya, which is one of relatively few African countries that is endowed with a
substantive cadastral system. The 1982 reform was not immediately able to turn the negative
trend from fiscal mismanagement during the 1970s. However, since around 2000, Kenya has
experienced a steadily increasing average growth rate.
5 Mechanisms
This section briefly explores two channels through which cadastral reforms could plausibly af-
fect economic growth: the level of the real natural interest rate and the ratio of physical capital
investment to GDP. We argued above that having a secure title to one’s land should imply
better access to credit and a greater willingness to invest in agricultural productive capital such
as ploughs, windmills and (in the 20th century) tractors. Such micro level developments on
individual farms might, in turn, induce a stronger farmer demand for public goods investment
such as better roads, secure market places, and eventually railroads and electrification. Along
similar lines, Acemoglu et al. (2019) argue that democratization should lead to greater invest-
ment and explore it as their first intermediate channel. In our simple conceptual framework,
we predicted that levels of investment should increase as a result of a cadastral reform whereas
the impact on the level of the real natural real interest rate was ambiguous and might either
increase or decrease depending on the strength of the investment demand and the collateralized
credit supply (“de Soto” effects).
We use recently published historical time series on the real interest rate (i.e. the nominal
interest rate net of inflation, in percent) from a few European countries collected by Schmelzing
(2020). Data is available for three of our four country cases: the United Kingdom (1314-2012),
France (1387-2012) and the Netherlands (1400-2012). The time series for the United Kingdom
(Figure A3 in the Appendix) shows that the annual data display a large degree of variation
and there is a strong falling trend (or “secular stagnation”) as we approach current times, as
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discussed more thoroughly in Schmelzing (2020). In our analysis, we make use of both the
annual data as well as the filtered series (which might be seen as a proxy for a more stable real
natural interest rate, as in Jorda et al. (2020)).
The equation that we estimate for each of the three countries is:






γt−l∆yt−l + τt + εt (4)
The dependent variable rt is either the annual real interest rate or a filtered average rate.
We include four lags of the dependent variable and output growth rates ∆yt, in line with the
main specification in the previous tables. We also include a linear time trend τt to control for
the falling level in real interest rates.
Table 7: Country case studies of the effect of Cadaster on the real interest rate, all years
Dependent variable:
Annual real interest rate Average real interest rate
UK France Netherlands UK France Netherlands
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cadaster 5.134*** -1.907 7.106*** .821*** -.552 1.527***
(1.050) (1.672) (1.882) (.286) (.425) (.514)
[1.20] n.a. n.a. [.35] n.a. n.a.
rt−l, lags 1-4
√ √ √ √ √ √
∆yt−l, lags 1-4
√ √ √ √ √ √
trend
√ √ √ √ √ √
N 695 588 599 691 584 595
R2 .56 .30 .14 .96 .90 .76
Note: This table reports the OLS estimates of the effect of Cadaster on the real interest rate (in
percent) in three countries. The dependent variable: the annual real interest rate (columns (1)-(3))
and the average real interest rate (a five-year moving average) in columns (4)-(6). All specifications
include four lags of the dependent variable, the growth rate of GDP per capita and a linear time trend
(not reported). Robust standard errors in ()-parentheses and Newey-West standard errors (four lags)
in []-parentheses, where available. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based on t-values from robust
standard errors.
Table 7 report the regression results. For the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the
estimates are positive and significant at the higest level for both dependent variables. The
interpretation that follows from our conceptual framework (Figure 1) is that the investment
demand effect is stronger than the “de Soto” (credit supply) effect in these countries, implying
a net increase in the real natural interest rate. The estimates for France are negative but not
significant. Since there is no reliable data on the user side of GDP so far back in time, we
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cannot assess statistically whether the cadastral reforms in the early 19th century in France
and the Netherlands were accompanied by major spikes in investment.
Data on investment levels as a share of GDP are available from around 1960. We define the
investment ratio in country i at time t as Iit. The equation that we estimate is equation (4). As
before, we control for L = 4 lags of income, as well as country and year fixed effects. In order
to check for pre-trends in the dependent variable, we also include lagged levels of investment.
The main parameter of interest is, as before, the coefficient for our Cadaster variable, β, which
we expect to be positive. However, we recognize that the impact of an institutional reform
on investment might take some time to materialize through its effect on investment demand,
credit supply, and the real interest rate. Hence, we estimate equation (4) by including lagged
levels of Cit.






γyit−l + αi + δt + εit (5)
Columns (1)-(5) of Table 8 show that the impact of Cadaster is not only positive, as
expected, but also increases over time. Figure A4 in the Appendix shows the evolution of the
estimate with 0-10 lags in Cadaster. The estimate peaks at 1.11 and is significant at 5-percent
level after 5 years, after which it falls. A full cadastral reform is thus expected to increase the
investment rate from a mean level of 23 to 24.11, five years after the reform.
Table 8: Effect of Cadaster on the Investment share of GDP, 1960-2015
Dependent variable:
Investment share of GDP 1960-2015
l=0 l=1 l=2 l=3 l=4 l=5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cadaster(t-l) .560 .516 .726 .830 .972* 1.11**
(.558) (.587) (.549) (.533) (.521) (.535)
Inv. share, lags 1-4
√ √ √ √ √ √
yt, lags 1-4
√ √ √ √ √ √
N 5218 5228 5237 5244 5250 5255
Countries 148 148 148 148 148 148
Note: This table reports the within estimates of the effect of Cadaster on Investment share of GDP,
1985-2015, in year t for different lags t-l of Cadaster. Unbalanced panel including up to 148 countries.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Each specification includes country and year fixed effects, four
lags of the dependent variable, and of yt. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This analysis suggests that GDP is boosted after a while through the investment channel,
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but the immediate effects of cadastral reforms on GDP levels and growth rates detected in
the previous analyses, seem to arise through some other channel. Comsumption could be
one of such channels, considering that the recording of property rights to land may increase
households’ instantaneous assessment of their lifetime net wealth. Total factor productivity
could be another potential channel, considering that output increases with a given level of
labor and capital input through a more productive or efficient use of resources. We leave it for
future work to explore these mechanisms further.
6 Discussion
The general tendency throughout the tables has been that our Cadaster indicator displays
a positive and significant coefficient when controlling for country and year fixed effects, pre-
trends in GDP per capita, as well as for other potentially relevant factors such as democracy
and population density. There is some indication that investment as a share of GDP acts as an
intermediate channel, but only with a time lag. We found that cadastral reforms appear to have
increased real interest rates in financially developed countries like the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands. The coefficient for Cadaster from the within panel regressions becomes more
often significant the closer we get to our own time period. There might of course be several
reasons for this result. One possibility is that cadastral reforms will only be effectively growth-
enhancing if they happen in an environment with competitive credit markets, as discussed by
Besley et al. (2012). We leave this question to be explored by future research.
Taken the results in their totality, we interpret them as being consistent with our hypothesis
that cadastral reforms should have a positive association with levels of GDP per capita. How-
ever, despite our efforts, we recognize that in long-run cross-country research, it is generally
nearly impossible to completely rule out reverse causality between institutional variables and
indicators for economic development or the presence of important omitted variables. Acemoglu
et al. (2019), as well as others, attempt to solve the endogeneity problem by employing GMM
and HHK estimators, in addition to including instrumental variables (IV) for changes in insti-
tutions. Unfortunately, it is often very hard to find an IV that credibly satisfies the exclusion
restriction of having a causal effect on the independent, endogenous variable, but not on the
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dependent variable.
We cannot completely rule out that there exists some omitted variable that influences both
cadastral institutions and GDP levels and hence threaten claims of a causal identification. In
our analysis we have controlled for a number of such variables, such as levels of democracy,
but not all. For example, our country examples suggest that cadastral reforms often happened
within a cluster of institutional reforms, which makes it hard to interpret the impact of cadaster
in isolation. We do not claim to have found a watertight strategy in this paper, nor that other
confounding effects do not exist. We do, however, believe we have demonstrated a very strong
correlation between cadastral institutional reforms and economic growth at the cross-country
level over a long term, which is well in line with the main trend in existing micro-level evidence.
We hope that our Cadaster variable will prove useful in future work on the relationship between
property rights reforms and economic development.
7 Conclusion
In line with the literature on the importance of property rights institutions for economic growth
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 1990) and more specific research on the effects of improving
land property rights and cadastral reforms (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010; Libecap & Lueck,
2011a; Yoo & Steckel, 2016), we hypothesized that cadastral reforms should have a positive
impact on economic growth since they imply more secure returns on investment, a reduction
in the resources needed to defend the rights to land, facilitate land market transactions and
increase access to credit. Using our newly developed measure of state-administered cadastral
records during the last 1000 years, Cadaster, we found that controlling for pre-trends in GDP,
country and year fixed effects in a large panel of countries, there is a statistically significant
and sizeable positive effect of the introduction of cadastral institutions on GDP per capita.
Although the limitations of cross-country observational data prevent us from being able to
definitively establish this as a causal relationship, the magnitude of the effects and robustness
of these results are suggestive and important. Our analysis of intermediate mechanisms suggest
that real interest rates and investment as a share of GDP, are affected by cadastral reforms.
A deeper analysis of these and other effects such as the impact on real estate prices and
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government tax revenues, are natural avenues for future research.
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A Constructing the Cadaster Indicator: Coding Prin-
ciples and Examples
In this Appendix we explain the main principles underpinning of our coding schema and provide
examples. An online 90+ page long Appendix Dates and Sources provides a comprehensive
description of the coding decisions with supporting references for all country/year observations.
A.1 Was there a state-administered cadaster?
To document the existence of a cadaster we went through several thousands sources in different
languages,16, including peer-reviewed publications, working papers, PhD theses, and reports of
the professional associations of land surveyors, national governments and aid organizations.
The emergence of state-administered cadaster is usually well-documented. There is both
reputable academic literature (f.e.Erba (2008); Haldrup & Stubkjær (2013); Kain & Baigent
(1992); Williamson & Enermark (1996)) and documents, prepared by professional surveyors
either as a service to their association (Cadastral Template is a description of the emergence
of cadaster in 66 countries) or to their governments or aid organizations.
A.2 Narrative or mapped cadaster?
Cadasters come in two forms: narrative and cartographic. Narrative and cartographic (mapped)
cadasters identify land assets differently. Narrative cadasters identify land assets using simple
instrumentation (e.g. rod, Gunter’s chain) and techniques (e.g. human observation of geo-
graphical landmarks, ranging) and describe them in sentences of a language: “Beginning at
a white oak in the fork of four mile run called the long branch and running No 88’ Wt three
hundred thirty eight poles to the Line of Capt. Pearson, then with the line of Pearson No 34’
Et One hundred Eighty eight poles to a Gum. (Libecap & Lueck, 2011a, p. 426-427). Early
cadasters, for example, the Chinese cadaster before 1143, Ottoman tahrir defterleri, Russian
pistovyi knigi or Swedish jordeböcker were narrative. However, narrative cadasters are not an
artefact of the past: for example, Brazil’s rural cadaster remained narrative until the turn of
the 21st century and Afghanistan’s only cadastral project of 1966-78 was carried out without
mapping.
Cartographic cadasters identify land parcels based on observations and measurements of a
more systematic character, compared to those of narrative cadasters. For example, cartographic
cadasters do not depend on the features of local geography (such as the white oak in the example
above) in the identification of land parcels. Furthermore, cartographic cadasters present the
information about a land holding’s location, dimensions and features diagrammatically, i.e. in
a drawing or sketch, accompanied by legend (see Figure 2).
Cartographic cadasters are a superior property rights assigning institution than narrative
cadasters for three reasons. First, cartographic cadasters identify the subject of property rights
more accurately as they rely on more sophisticated instrumentation (e.g. theodolite, lidar) and
techniques (e.g. triangulation) of land surveying than narrative cadasters. Second, mapped
cadasters present the information in a more transparent way, allowing cadastral information
to be understood by economic agents without local knowledge, thereby facilitating trade and
other land-related market transactions. Third, a system of mapped cadasters often led to a
standard where land was divided into rectangular plots of similar size, whereas traditional
land-holdings were often divided into smaller and irregular polygons which made their value
less easy to assess in the local land markets. Figure A1 contrasts an example of a rectangular
16Mostly English, but also Spanish, Russian, French and Portuguese
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land demarcation in contemporary Ohio, United States, with a non-rectangular demarcation
west of Abuja in contemporary Nigeria. The scale is the same in both maps. In 2015, the
Cadaster score for United States as a whole was 1 and the score for Nigeria was 0.03.
Figure A1: Left Panel: Satellite image of land demarcation in Ohio, 2020; Right panel: Satellite
image of land demarcation in Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria
Note: Images constructed from Google Maps. Same scale is applied to both maps.
To quantify the difference between mapped and narrative cadasters we, first, draw on the
specialized literature that treats cartographic cadasters as an evolutionary development of
narrative cadasters, and sees the distance between narrative and cartographic cadasters to be
smaller than the distance between no cadaster and a narrative cadaster. This suggests that the
weight of the narrative cadasters should be larger than 0.5. In other to quantify this weight
with higher precision, we draw on Libecap & Lueck (2011a), who found, in the context of a
natural experiment in Ohio, that areas where land assets were identified through narrative
cadasters had fewer mortgages, conveyances and lower land value, compared to areas with
cartographic, rectangular cadasters. They point out that the precision of property rights in
narrative cadasters is lower, compared to cartographic ones, as “outsiders have little knowledge
of local conditions and topography to determine the exact location and nature of parcels to be
traded on” (Libecap & Lueck, 2011b, p. 260). In their most conservative estimation, Libecap
& Lueck (2011b) found that switching from a narrative to cartographic cadaster yields an
increase in land value per acre of over 40 percent (Libecap & Lueck, 2011b, p.287-288). To
exemplify, a land parcel valued at $12 under narrative cadaster would be valued at least $16,8
under cartographic cadaster. In other words, the value of the same land parcel under narrative
cadaster is only 0.71 of its value under the cartographic cadaster. Because the Libecap & Lueck
(2011b)’s estimate of 0.71 is “most conservative”, we code country/years with narrative cadaster
as 0.75 and country/years with cartographic cadaster as 1. Another reason for weighting
narrative cadasters as more than half (0.5) of the cartographic ones is because the specialized
literature treats cartographic cadasters as an evolutionary development of narrative cadasters,
and sees the distance between narrative and cartographic cadasters to be much smaller than
the distance between no cadaster and a narrative cadaster.
A.3 How much of the country’s territory was covered by the cadaster?
In the third step of the data construction, we specify the coverage of state-administered cadas-
tral recording across a country’s territory. As a general rule, we calculate the implementation
weight as a percentage of the current territory under cadaster. Table A1 illustrates an example
of coding for Ireland.
Coding information:
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Table A1: Coding example: Ireland
Year Cadaster event Cadaster type Cadaster coverage, Score
% of the territory
1586-1655 1 1 2,75 0,0275
1656-1847 1 1 66 0,66
1848-2015 1 1 100 1
1586-1655: (1, 1, .0275). The first survey of the Munster plantation (land confiscated by the
English Crown, following the Desmond rebellions); mapped; covering approximately 500,000
acres (Andrews 2007: 1680; Andrews 1985; MacCarthy-Morrogh 1983), which constitutes 2,75
percent of the current territory.
1656:1847: (1, 1, .66). The Down Survey, mapped, estimated at 12 million acres, or two-
thirds of the island of Ireland (House of Commons 1824: 32).
1848-2015: (1,1,1). The Griffith’s Valuation (carried out between 1848 and 1864 to de-
termine liability to pay the Poor rate), accompanied by Ordnance Survey maps, full coverage
(National Library of Ireland, n.d.).
This coding principle applies to all historical (pre-1900) cadasters in Europe, settler colonies
(the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and colonial surveys (e.g. British India and
Burma or Japanese Korea).
Although scholarly consensus exists on most of the incidents of cadaster reform, evidence
with regard to some land reforms remains inconclusive. For example, the literature remains
inconclusive regarding the implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 (Quataert,
1997; Ruedy, 1971; Tute, 1929, p. 858-859), with most researchers agreeing that it was not
fully implemented. In the absence of any data on implementation, we assign a 50 percent
implementation weight. Similarly, a 50 percent weight is applied to the case of pre-colonial
Korea (Yoo & Steckel, 2016). This can be revised as new evidence becomes available.
For post-1900 cadasters we have to account for different dynamics of cadastrification of
urban and rural land, impelled by rapid urbanization in the 20th century. While cadaster
reforms took place in many countries of the world since the 1900s (see Figure 4), in many
countries the implementation varied substantially between rural and urban lands. The case
of Colombia typifies the situation in Latin America, where urban cadasters progressed at a
much high speed than rural cadasters. In Colombia, since the early 1930s 66 percent of all
urban parcels have been properly surveyed and registered, but only 16 percent of rural parcels
(Barajas, 2016). On the other hand, a recent program of certification of rural land in Ethiopia
resulted in 60 percent of rural parcels being covered by a narrative cadaster, compared to 30
percent of urban parcels being mapped and registered (Shibeshi, 2011). To calculate z3it, we
multiply the share of cadastrified rural/urban parcels by the share of rural/urban population
and sum the products.17 To illustrate, after independence in 1989, Namibia’s effort to main-
tain the cadaster inherited from the times under the South African’s mandate resulted in 20
percent of rural parcels and 60 percent of urban parcels being properly registered and surveyed
(Owolabi, 2004). We multiply 20 and 60 by the shares of rural and urban population (64.3 and
35.7 percent correspondingly) and sum the terms to obtain z3Namibia = 0.343 for the 1990-2004
period.
While parcel-based measure of the coverage — share of the properly surveyed and registered
17z3it= (share of rural surveyed and registered parcels x share of rural population) + (share of urban surveyed
and registered parcels x share of urban population)).
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parcels in the total number of parcels — is the the most accurate measure, it is not available for
all country/years. For most of the remaining country/years we have data on the implementation
of rural cadasters, but the data comes in a number of different forms. First, it comes as the
share of regularized agricultural land over the total agricultural land. For example, between
1949 and 1972 Ecuador regularized 1,45 million hectares out of 16,2 million hectares of land
suitable for agriculture, livestock exploitation and forestry. Second, data on the coverage of
rural cadasters comes as the share of the total land, which needs to be normalized through the
share of agricultural land in the total land to calculate the coverage. For example, post-Soviet
Azerbaijan successfully utilized cadasters of the Soviet-era collective farms (i.e. agricultural
land) to regularize privatized land, amounting to 20 percent of the territory in 2004. By
expressing this 20 percent as a share of agricultural land (58 percent in 2003), we calculate
rural component of z3Azerbaijan2004 as 0.34.
Finally, for a number of country/years the available coverage data is even less specific. First,
the coverage is reported in the number of owners having legal documents to land. For example,
in 1975 Algeria began a program of cadastrification of the territory suitable for agriculture —
north of the 34th parallel (World Bank 1992, 7). However, in 1992 only “5 percent of private
rural and urban owners have legal evidence of their property rights” (World Bank 1992, 6; see
also World Bank 1992, 9; World Bank 2001, 2). In such cases we assume the share of owners
to be equivalent to the share in the total number of parcels. In the case of Algeria z3Algeria1992
= 0.05.
Second, reporting standards of cadastral projects are often inconsistent. For example, the
units of measurement (“parcels”, “municipal areas”, “hectares”) in the World Bank’s Land
Administration Project I in Guatemala vary not only between the appraisal and completion
reports, but also between different regions of the country (World Bank 2010: 70). In such
cases we anchor the score component z3it in the total of the country’s territory. In the case of
Guatemala, based on the World Bank’s reports, we conclude that by 2007 cadaster was fully
functional in five departments of Guatemala, yeilding z3Guatemala2007 = 0.47.
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B Analysis
Figure A2: Event study of partial cadastral reform in Kenya in 1982 on average GDP growth
rate per capita 1950-2015
Note: The figures shows an event study of a partial reform in 1982 in Kenya on all available GDP
levels 1950-2015. The vertical axis shows a five-year moving average of growth rates in GDP per
capita. The figures show fitted polynomial regression lines with 5-percent confidence intervals before
and after year of reform.
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Figure A3: Real interest rate in the United Kingdom, 1314-2012
Note: The figure shows the real interest rate in United Kingdom during 1314-2012. The thin grey line
shows annual rates and the thick red line shows a five-year moving average. Data source: Schmelzing
(2020).
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Figure A4: Response of Cadaster on Investment share of GDP per capita, 1960-2015
Note: The figure shows the response of Cadaster on Investment share of GDP per capita with up to
ten lags in Cadaster as specified in equation 5.
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